It prevailed in a bidding war for Greece’s Emporiki, a money-losing, government-owned lender. A senior Crédit Agricole executive said at the time that the deal reflected “the confidence we have in the Greek economy and the superior growth of the Greek banking sector.
The euro may fall as much as 28 percent if France fails to repay investors, while a default by the Spanish government would trigger a 20 percent currency devaluation, Italy a 17 percent drop and Germany a 25 percent decline, according to Citigroup.
The Spanish government faces what Mr Parenteau calls “the paradox of public thrift”: the less it borrows, the more it will end up owing.
What we are currently experiencing is a crisis of public finances in advanced economies. It started with Greece, and the euro, because of the specific institutional framework which prevents Greece and the other euro area countries from using the inflation tax to overcome their budgetary problems. This will force euro area countries to address their fiscal positions earlier. It’s not easy. But it will be done, because it can be done and it has to be done in any case. And, last but not least, because there are no alternatives.
In Japan and Western Europe, where the birthrate is way below the replacement rate and immigration is either severely restricted or not well assimilated into the society, the burden of the aged rises so dramatically that their social structures might collapse under the strain.
WAGES IN THE PERIPHERY NEED TO FALL 20-30 PERCENT RELATIVE TO GERMANY.
Should the deal fail, Greece “might do a kind of dual currency in which they use their scarce euros to meet their external commitments and in the meantime use an internal IOU, rather as Californian and some of the Argentinian states did, in order to meet their internal commitments” Goodhart said. “It would be a dual currency and the internal currency would fluctuate compared to the euro.